There will always be those of us who do not care about TV at all
I could care less about Hollywood TV shows with or without DRM, so I am free to disable DRM support in any machine I have. I would not run Chrome (google closed especially) as I go out of my way not to have any kind of Google history (search or otherwise) reachable by all those "terror" databases. There will always be alternative browsers and forks that make no effort to support DRM, and in Firefox it will be a "content decryption" module you can prevent from downloading. FOSS is about options, what we REALLY don't want is for Netflix or anything else to be able to force people to run Windoze.
What makes even the "srongest" DRM crackable is of course the old key distribution issue. Let's look at this from a role-reversal standpoint:
Suppose I need to transmit a video in such a way that only an activist pro-bono lawyer team can watch it, and the prosecution cannot. I can ask the legal team to send me a GPG key, and use that to send an encrypted message carrying a passphrase, then send an encrypted tarball containing a filesystem with the video on it. If that same video had to go direct to every ACLU intern on Turtle Island, I would have a real problem with key distribution and any shortcuts to simplify it (compared to the standard of each intern getting a separate PGP encrypted email with a different passphrase in it) would probably open the whole scheme to a side-channel attack. Worse, a single undercover cop working at ACLU could decrypt and repost the video. as all copies are the same once decrypted. As you see, this "DRM" would only be both usable and trustworthy if the recipient list is very small.
Originally posted by 3vi1
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What makes even the "srongest" DRM crackable is of course the old key distribution issue. Let's look at this from a role-reversal standpoint:
Suppose I need to transmit a video in such a way that only an activist pro-bono lawyer team can watch it, and the prosecution cannot. I can ask the legal team to send me a GPG key, and use that to send an encrypted message carrying a passphrase, then send an encrypted tarball containing a filesystem with the video on it. If that same video had to go direct to every ACLU intern on Turtle Island, I would have a real problem with key distribution and any shortcuts to simplify it (compared to the standard of each intern getting a separate PGP encrypted email with a different passphrase in it) would probably open the whole scheme to a side-channel attack. Worse, a single undercover cop working at ACLU could decrypt and repost the video. as all copies are the same once decrypted. As you see, this "DRM" would only be both usable and trustworthy if the recipient list is very small.
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