Originally posted by highlandsun
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New Group Calls For Boycotting Systemd
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Originally posted by Awesomeness View PostIf his software is so bad, it should be very easy for everybody else to write better software.
He is also not the only developer of systemd etc.
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Originally posted by prodigy_ View PostSpot on. People are mistaking Lennart's manic hyperactivity for brilliance and his obsession with writing crapware for competence. The guy is a mediocre software designer and programmer at best. He has A LOT of energy but this doesn't necessarily mean he would be able to use it in the best interests of the community even if he wanted to.
He is also not the only developer of systemd etc.
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Originally posted by highlandsun View PostI stayed out of the debate before, but now I've stumbled across a concrete reason to avoid all of this stuff.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/artic...tering-systemd
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Originally posted by discordian View Post- OOM safe - LMDB does practically no memory allocations of its own - readers require zero mallocs, writers seldom require more than 1. It can never use enough memory to drive a system into swapping; it can never cause an OOM (out of memory) condition.Its also mmaping the database, which I guess could pose problems on 32bit Target since that space cant be used for anything else... particulary if it should fit in a fraction of the 4Gb Addresspace like some embedded cpus require/favor for kernel/userspace seperation and not to mention other things you`d have to map and reserved ranges.
Further I am not so sure the ACID "semantics" will actually hold in every case if you use the host systems file caching (power loss)
Their preliminary results indicate they found 1 crash vulnerability in LMDB, but after I contacted them for clarification it turned out they were mistaken. LMDB has zero crash vulnerabilities. They will be presenting their corrected/final results at OSDI confirming this https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi14
When you compare this to their rationale, it doesnt seems out of place to search for alternatives:
Seems like listing a unreasonable best-case scenario for LMDB without looking at the big picture of the actual requirements. And missing the point, since the thing about systemd is excatly trying to get the overall system right, if part of it suck then noone prevents a replacement. Those quite possibly will happen.
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"Unix Philosopy" has no bearing on user security or usability
Originally posted by droste View PostI've no problem reading it without an account even with noscript on, so:
Lennart said he can't use existing DBMS for journald because of his requirements and the post says that he wasn't/isn't right and LMDB meets all the requirements he had.
The post then argues, that this is clearly NIH and in the last paragraph that systemd is not in the sense of "the unix philosophy" therefore Lennart and the systemd team can not be trusted.
Note that this is a summery of the post, not my view on this subject.
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Thank you
Originally posted by finalzone View PostHere is the full text
From where I stand "trust" means being able to rely on someone not to engage in intentionally malicious behavior. Intentional malice towards the user normally means intentional bugs, back doors, or spyware from where I stand., Intentional malice towards the user of a system can also mean an attempt to make it impossible for a user to migrate their data to another OS, such as a proprietary format for user data (not system logs). If journald was say, a spreadsheet program, and the backend was something odd this would qualify, but system log portability is far less important. At any rate, journald can be told to echo all output to syslog as it goes if this is an issue.
Malicious behavior in journald would be something like a code that would prevent mounting a special forensic volume from making journal entries, or echoing the contents to a hidden file either stashed somewhere on disk (for recovery by law enforcement) or emailed out to either the programmer (phone home) or to law enforcement upon special activation. If systemd does not do something like this, I deem it trustworthy enough for my uses.
"Malicious behavior" towards BSD does not affect me as I am a Linux user, and as my heavily customized OS is almost a private distro (with about a dozen users) I have noticed nothing that would force me to use it unless I want to include GNOME or rely on upstream packages compiled against it. Converting my Ubuntu based but heavily modified main OS to it was a matter of choice, so I could get my customized boot-time stuff ported over long before I would have to pin Upstart or something else. If most systems in use end up on systemd, that's actually a benefit for programmers of anything that starts at boot time, as just like back in the sysvinit days only one init system would need to be supported. Maybe that would allow finally putting an end to wholesale use of sysvinit scripts now used simply for universal compatability.
As for package manager indicated dependencies, I am well enough versed in those that if I had a valid need to use some other init system, I'd make a dummy package providing the missing dependencies-or put the "provides" directly into the replacement packages. Hell, just to get a modern version of Dracut installed to use systemd in the initramfs I had to remove the conflicts with initramfs-tools from the dracut DEBIAN file, plus make some other modifications. I left initramfs-tools installed so I can create a non-systemd initramfs to boot to upstart if an update breaks systemd. Yes, I've had that happen, as expected on a hacked alpha distro.
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Originally posted by finalzone View PostHere is the full text
Further I am not so sure the ACID "semantics" will actually hold in every case if you use the host systems file caching (power loss)
- does not require file locks; readers don't block writers, and writers don't block readers.
Lets see what the doc says:
Originally posted by LMDBThere is normally no pure read-only mode, since readers need write access to locks and lock file. Exceptions: On read-only filesystems or with the MDB_NOLOCK flag described under mdb_env_open().
Originally posted by LMDBDo not use LMDB databases on remote filesystems, even between processes on the same host. This breaks flock() on some OSes, possibly memory map sync, and certainly sync between programs on different hosts.
Originally posted by Lennart PoetteringIt should not require file locks or communication between multiple
readers or between readers and the writer. This is primarily a
question of security (we cannot allow users to lock out root or the
writer from acessing the logs by taking a lock) and network
transparency (file locks on network FS are very very flaky), but also
performance.
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Originally posted by highlandsun View PostMore importantly, their NIH led them to create a solution (journald) that is broken by design - it is inherently vulnerable to crash corruption, and as the linked bug report shows, the corruptions are well known by the developers and they have no idea how to fix them. The key point is that no single team can possibly have expertise in every aspect of a complex system, and the systemd developers' all-in-one philosophy will inevitably lead them to make more such unfixable design mistakes.
They don't say they don't know how to fix it, they say there's nothing to fix anyway.
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Originally posted by highlandsun View PostThe key point is that no single team can possibly have expertise in every aspect of a complex system, and the systemd developers' all-in-one philosophy will inevitably lead them to make more such unfixable design mistakes.
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