Intel Rolls Out 10nm Pentium/Celeron CPUs, Previews Rocket Lake

[coder]

I will readily give my data to the Chinese if it means that the Americans can't get their hands on it.

There's one key difference I know, for sure: the US does not use the instrument of state surveillance for industrial espionage.

That said... something about people in glass houses (if you know the saying), so I'll leave it at that.

[coder]

The "78%" number comes from https://www.intel.com/content/www/us...on-brief.html:

where footnote 7 means:

"As measured by 3DMark Fire Strike^E graphics score."

This wasn't that hard to find. I am not sure why you weren't able to lookup the information yourselves.

** golf clap **

Okay, so their point is that students (and perhaps teachers, too) can procrastinate up to 78% faster, when they're supposed to be working on their STEM projects. Makes sense.
; )

[Sonadow]

There's one key difference I know, for sure: the US does not use the instrument of state surveillance for industrial espionage.

That said... something about people in glass houses (if you know the saying), so I'll leave it at that.

Perhaps America should start taking its own advice. The world will become a much better place for sure.

Also, update your quote while you're at it; i fixed a grammatical error in my previous post.

[f0rmat]

How nice, accusing the Chinese of planting backdoors when to date there has been no concrete proof of any Chinese hardware being compromised in the supply chain. Conversely, there has been irrevocable proof that the US backdoored critical computing and networking infrastructure to actively spy on others, even its own Five Eyes allies.

I will readily give my data to the Chinese if it means that the Americans can't get their hands on it.

I think there is proof...ZTE. If you work for the US government or are a contractor working for the US government, you are not authorized to use any ZTE (and I think Huwei) products in the conduct of ANY business or use them professionally because of known hardware backdoors. (Personal use is another matter, but you cannot bring them to work.) In addition, IIRC, SuperMicro a few years back discovered that on their mainboards there were hardware backdoors being baked into the networking chips on the SuperMicro motherboards that were being manufactured in China.

I am not accusing China of being the only one that creates backdoors - however, they seem to be the the primary creator of hardware backdoors. The USG (any MANY other countries) usually use software backdoors or take advantage of poorly written code. (Or utilize the court systems to get warrants.)

[Sonadow]

I think there is proof...ZTE. If you work for the US government or are a contractor working for the US government, you are not authorized to use any ZTE (and I think Huwei) products in the conduct of ANY business or use them professionally because of known hardware backdoors. (Personal use is another matter, but you cannot bring them to work.)

No hardware backdoors were ever discovered to be on ZTE or Huawei hardware. Even the UK with is strong "China-bad "stance had to admit that there were none after it audited Huawei's source code.

ZTE and Huawei are America's punching bags only because ZTE is state-owned and Huawei's founder is a retired PLA officer, and both companies combined consume the lion's share of global telecommunication infrastructure due to their lower costs.

Huawei in particular was a target ever since they leapfrogged past the US and the West in 5G development. While other countries were still standardizing their 5G specifications, Huawei already deployed 5G cell stations for end-user consumption in China.

In addition, IIRC, SuperMicro a few years back discovered that on their mainboards there were hardware backdoors being baked into the networking chips on the SuperMicro motherboards that were being manufactured in China.

I am not accusing China of being the only one that creates backdoors - however, they seem to be the the primary creator of hardware backdoors. The USG (any MANY other countries) usually use software backdoors or take advantage of poorly written code. (Or utilize the court systems to get warrants.)

That was a witch hunt that ended up fizzling out as quickly as it began. When even the Department of Homeland Security says that there was no evidence that Supermicro server boards had been compromised in the supply chain, the whole story loses its credibility instantly. All it did was cause unnecessary panic that was designed to stoke up anti-China sentiments and sway businesses into breaking contracts with their Chinese suppliers.

And if China's semiconductor industry was advanced enough to create such undetectable backdoors in hardware, why would they even need to import semiconductors for use in assembling finished products, and then go through the trouble poke holes in and exploit it? Why not just create its own domestic semiconductor replacements with the backdoor integrated within, as opposed to grafting it on imported chips? Why is the CCP pouring billions into research on semiconductor design and fabrication now after its champion, SMIC, was placed on the US trade entity list, if its semicon industry was as super advanced as what people are saying? Another one of those 'the enemy is both weak and strong at the same time' nonsense?

"Oh, the Chinese semiconductor industry is advanced enough to create chips with undetectable backdoors, but third-rate enough that they can't even make decent domestic chips." Please ponder on that and decide how absurd it is.

[scottishduck]

There's one key difference I know, for sure: the US does not use the instrument of state surveillance for industrial espionage.

That said... something about people in glass houses (if you know the saying), so I'll leave it at that.

Industrial espionage has been a sanctioned function of the CIA for a long time.

[f0rmat]

Industrial espionage has been a sanctioned function of the CIA for a long time.

But the CIA can only operate against foreign governments and/or against foreign companies.

[L_A_G]

Kinda telling that they ran the 8C/16T 11900K against the 12C/24T Ryzen 9 5900 in games at low resolutions, which favors the higher frequencies lower core counts allow for. A proper comparison to a Ryzen 7 5800X will probably offer pathetic gains if not parity at a higher price.

Intel also seems to still be stuck on 14nm for their bigger die products, which suggests there's still a high number of defects per wafer on average using the 10nm process and that it's only economical to use on small dies due to the lower wastage per-defect. Either that or their contract with Nokia, a long time chip foundry customer of theirs, for the production of Nokia's "reefshark" 5G chips on the 10nm node eats up a big chunk of 10nm capacity due to a minimum supply contract negotiated before they realized how hard bringing up said process would be.

I'm actually not kidding here. Nokia has fallen behind in 5G networks much in part due to being slow in their move from FPGAs to ASICs, new standards always starting out on FPGA-based software radios and then moving on ASICs once they solidify. ASICs offer better performance at lower cost and Nokia has simply been unable to ramp up production of the ASIC solutions based on their "reefshark" chips due to an insufficient supply of them. Then again the relationship could be in Intel's favor and it's just more profitable to sell 10nm production to a desperate Nokia than more price-conscious customers.

[coder]

No hardware backdoors were ever discovered to be on ZTE or Huawei hardware. Even the UK with is strong "China-bad "stance had to admit that there were none after it audited Huawei's source code.

Even if this is true, today, it doesn't mean backdoors can't be added via a future software or firmware update. It's also difficult to say with 100% certainty that no backdoors exist.

ZTE and Huawei are America's punching bags only because ZTE is state-owned and Huawei's founder is a retired PLA officer, and both companies combined consume the lion's share of global telecommunication infrastructure due to their lower costs.

A big problem with that theory is that the US no longer has competitors in some of those markets. Meanwhile, Chinese national security law compels those companies to comply with orders in the interest of the Chinese state.

When even the Department of Homeland Security says that there was no evidence that Supermicro server boards had been compromised in the supply chain, the whole story loses its credibility instantly.

Source? I'm curious exactly what they said about this, which you're paraphrasing.

And if China's semiconductor industry was advanced enough to create such undetectable backdoors in hardware, why would they even need to import semiconductors for use in assembling finished products, and then go through the trouble poke holes in and exploit it? Why not just create its own domestic semiconductor replacements with the backdoor integrated within, as opposed to grafting it on imported chips?

Because one delivers results in months, while the other could take the better part of a decade.

Why is the CCP pouring billions into research on semiconductor design and fabrication now after its champion, SMIC, was placed on the US trade entity list, if its semicon industry was as super advanced as what people are saying? Another one of those 'the enemy is both weak and strong at the same time' nonsense?

Strawman argument. It's not their strength that landed them on that list.

"Oh, the Chinese semiconductor industry is advanced enough to create chips with undetectable backdoors, but third-rate enough that they can't even make decent domestic chips." Please ponder on that and decide how absurd it is.

False dichotomy. It's comparatively easy to pull off an exploit like what Bloomberg documented, by comparison with the difficulty of catching up to world-class semiconductor fabrication. One need look no further than Global Foundries and Intel to see just how hard it is to stay in that game, much less catch up from essentially zero.

I was willing to cut you some slack, as an obvious non-US citizen, but your energetic embrace of disingenuous arguments have my spidey senses tingling. Whatever you're peddling, I ain't buying it.

[coder]

Industrial espionage has been a sanctioned function of the CIA for a long time.

Source?

I don't believe the strucures for this sort of thing even exist. I also doubt it could remain under wraps, if it were really happening.